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INTRODUCTION 
“You have the right to an attorney.  If you cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be appointed for you.”1  When we hear this phrase 
                                                                                                                             
* Sarah Lustbader is a Senior Program Associate in the Center on Sentencing and 
Corrections at the Vera Institute of Justice.  She previously worked as a public 
defender at The Bronx Defenders.  Sarah holds a J.D. from N.Y.U. School of Law, 
where she served on the N.Y.U. Law Review, and a B.A. from Stanford University. 
 1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see Alex McBride, Landmark 
Cases: Miranda v. Arizona (1966), PBS: THE SUPREME COURT (Dec. 2006), 
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/landmark_miranda.html 
[https://perma.cc/SH25-M4YL]. 
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recited to a suspect during an episode of Law & Order, we assume 
that justice will be done, equally and fairly, no matter the 
circumstances.  Whether the suspect has been arrested for a serious 
felony or for a trivial violation, whether he is guilty or innocent, white 
or minority, rich or poor, employed or unemployed—in all of these 
cases, the criminal justice system will work swiftly and fairly to find 
the truth, with minimal inconvenience and cost to the accused.  In 
practice, this is far from the truth: many people who have been 
accused of any crime—even a victimless crime or a crime they did not 
commit—suffer severe consequences that impede their livelihoods 
and disrupt their lives while serving no appreciable public interest.  
And those adverse consequences fall disproportionately—in some 
cases entirely—on the low-income people that the criminal justice 
system should be committed to protecting.  Generally, those attorneys 
who pursue public defense as a calling do so for this reason: they 
know that even with an attorney, the odds are stacked against 
indigent criminal defendants.  But many are surprised at just how 
stark the contrast can be.  For this Symposium marking the fiftieth 
anniversary of David Caplovitz’s seminal work, The Poor Pay More,2 
I draw on my experiences as a public defender in the Bronx to 
elucidate how criminal charges—and in particular, low-level 
charges—can prove far costlier in time and dollars for indigent 
defendants, and how this phenomenon can keep the poor in poverty. 
This Essay imagines the paths of two individuals, each arrested for 
misdemeanor drug-possession.3  It follows Joe, an indigent, thirty-
year-old black man, and Richard, a middle class, thirty-year old white 
man, through identical drug possession cases and traces the ways in 
which their cases—and the costs involved—diverge due to the race 
and wealth differences between the two men.4  The Essay tracks the 
cases through arrest, bail hearing, pendency of the case, plea 
negotiations, and aftermath.  I conclude by proposing five changes to 
state-level criminal law, procedure, and policy, one at each stage of 
the case, that can help ease the poverty tax inherent in criminal cases:  
(1) eliminate policing practices that pull low-income people into the 
criminal justice system; (2) encourage judges to make individualized 
                                                                                                                             
 2. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES (1967). 
 3. A misdemeanor is a minor offense that is punishable by no more than one 
year in jail. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 2017).  Non-criminal violations 
are lesser offenses that are punishable by no more than fifteen days in jail. Id. 
§ 10.00(2)–(3).  
 4. These hypotheticals are based on my observations, made primarily while 
working as a public defender in the Bronx. 
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bail assessments tailored to what families can afford; (3) get rid of the 
requirement for all criminal defendants to appear in court on each of 
their court dates; (4) create meaningful, affordable, and feasible 
alternatives to incarceration that do not require defendants to pay for 
their freedom; and (5) ban all but the most essential collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions. 
I.  TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE 
A. Arrest 
Joe’s chances of being arrested are markedly higher than 
Richard’s, regardless of culpability.  Joe is a person of color in the 
South Bronx, in the poorest congressional district in the country.5  
Richard is a white man who lives a few miles away on the Upper East 
Side of Manhattan, in the wealthiest congressional district.6  Stops 
and searches by the police that lead to arrests are an uncommon 
occurrence on the Upper East Side and rarely target white people in 
any neighborhood, but they are an everyday occurrence for people of 
color in the South Bronx.7  Police on patrol in the South Bronx may 
conduct a stop that leads to Joe’s arrest.  In addition to increased 
police patrols and stops, there are several other police practices that 
are far more common in low-income neighborhoods than in wealthier 
ones.  First, an officer may spot discarded drugs or drug paraphernalia 
                                                                                                                             
 5. See Bronx Cheer: Seeking Votes in America’s Poorest, Most Democratic 
District, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21696938-seeking-votes-americas-poorest-most-democratic-district-bronx-
cheer [https://perma.cc/2KY5-H3DJ]. 
 6. See Kelsey Warner, Where Are the Richest Voter Districts in the U.S.?, BUS. 
2 CMTY. (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.business2community.com/government-politics/
richest-voter-districts-u-s-01516219 [https://perma.cc/U5T3-9V7S]. 
 7. In 2013, a federal judge found the New York Police Department liable for a 
pattern and practice of racial profiling and unconstitutional stops in heavily policed 
neighborhoods, including the Bronx. See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  In another decision, following a preliminary 
injunction hearing in a related stop-and-frisk case focusing solely on police stops 
made in the Bronx, the court found: 
[W]hile it may be difficult to say where, precisely, to draw the line between 
constitutional and unconstitutional police encounters, such a line exists, and 
the NYPD has systematically crossed it when making trespass stops outside 
TAP buildings in the Bronx.  For those of us who do not fear being stopped 
as we approach or leave our own homes or those of our friends and families, 
it is difficult to believe that residents of one of our boroughs live under such 
a threat.  In light of the evidence presented at the hearing, however, I am 
compelled to conclude that this is the case. 
Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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on the ground and charge a passerby with possession of those drugs 
or drug paraphernalia.8  Second, Joe might be approached by an 
undercover officer posing as an addict looking for a fix.9  If Joe directs 
the undercover officer to a dealer and facilitates a small drug deal, he 
can be charged with felony-level drug sale, even if he never sold or 
even possessed drugs.10  Joe is far more likely to be arrested than 
Richard, even if Richard routinely walks around with a substantial 
amount of controlled substances, and Joe never does.11 
If he is arrested, Richard can call one of several attorneys he 
knows.  He could call his sister, who is a civil lawyer, or his college 
roommate who became a prosecutor.  That attorney can invoke his 
rights to the police,12 thereby halting any police questioning, and can 
come to the precinct to witness any lineup or other procedures, 
voicing any objections to the process and generally acting as an 
additional pair of eyes, warding against abuses of police authority.  
Joe, on the other hand, counts no lawyers among his family or friends, 
and although his brother liked the public defender he was assigned 
for a minor arrest last year, he does not have her phone number on 
hand.  Police are therefore free to question Joe and try to get him to 
make an inculpatory statement.  Because he was arrested in New 
York City, Joe does not receive representation until his bail hearing, 
which means that he does not benefit from legal counsel while 
detained by police.13  Even though he denies the charge of drug 
possession, the officers manage to make him nervous enough to trip 
                                                                                                                             
 8. As a public defender in the Bronx, I encountered a number of individuals who 
were arrested and charged under similar circumstances. 
 9. See Joseph Goldstein, Undercover Officers Ask Addicts to Buy Drugs, 
Snaring Them but Not Dealers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/05/nyregion/undercover-officers-ask-addicts-to-buy-drugs-snaring-them-but-
not-dealers.html?_r=0 [https://nyti.ms/2kBHn7L]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Police have been found to conduct unconstitutional stops in the Bronx in 
particular. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Stop-and-Frisk Program in Bronx Is 
Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/09/nyregion/judge-limits-nypd-stop-and-frisk-program-in-bronx.html 
[https://nyti.ms/VIEa2z]. 
 12. See People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 170 (1979) (“[O]nce an attorney has 
entered the proceeding, thereby signifying that the police should cease questioning, a 
defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel.”). 
 13. In New York, defendants are entitled to representation beginning at 
arraignment. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(3) (McKinney 2017).  However, recent 
cases have shown that this right has not always been honored in practice. See Hurrell-
Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 20–21 (2010) (“Recognizing the crucial importance of 
arraignment and the extent to which a defendant’s basic liberty and due process 
interests may then be affected, CPL 180.10 (3) expressly provides for the ‘right to the 
aid of counsel at the arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action . . . .’”).  
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over his words when explaining where he was headed when the police 
stopped and arrested him.  The prosecutor can later use that 
misstatement during a bail hearing to make Joe appear suspicious.  
Joe also does not have the benefit of an attorney’s presence for any 
part of identification or other pre-booking procedures.  Even before 
the case has begun, police have a greater opportunity to create a case 
against Joe than Richard. 
B. Bail Hearing 
The bail hearing, an early court appearance during which the 
charges are read and the judge makes a bail determination, presents 
the clearest difference between Richard’s experience and Joe’s.  
Richard will almost surely walk out of court and fight his case from 
the outside, while Joe may be forced to spend weeks, months, or even 
years14 in jail while his case is pending.  The most obvious reason for 
this is that Richard’s friends and family have more cash readily 
available to pay any bail that might be set.  Depending on the judge, 
the jurisdiction, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, and on Richard 
and Joe’s respective prior experiences with the criminal justice 
system, a judge might release them on their own recognizance or 
might set bail of several thousand dollars. In most other states, 
defendants are not guaranteed an attorney at all during bail 
proceedings, so unless they have a private lawyer or the locality 
chooses to provide public defenders at that stage, they are not 
represented when bail is determined.15  
But let us suppose that, despite all this, bail is set equally.  The 
judge sets bail at “$2000 bond/$1000 cash” for both Joe and Richard, 
meaning that they can bail out by paying $1000 in cash or by getting a 
bond worth $2000.  Richard can easily get any number of friends or 
relatives to withdraw $1000 and, if they post it at the courthouse, he 
can be released directly from court before being taken to Rikers 
Island.  At the end of his case, assuming Richard has not absconded, 
the court will return about ninety percent of the posted bail.  Richard 
is a software engineer at a successful start-up firm.  When he is 
arrested, he calls his boss and says he needs to take two personal days 
                                                                                                                             
 14. See William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive 
Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-misdemeanor-cases-trials-are-elusive.html 
[https://perma.cc/VML4-CT59] (studying fifty-four marijuana misdemeanor cases and 
showing many cases lasted well over a year, none of which received a trial). 
 15. See Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 
31 CRIM. JUST. 23, 23 (2016). 
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for an emergency.  No questions are asked, and his pay and 
employment are not affected.  Richard rents his apartment from a 
private landlord, who never finds out about his arrest, and by next 
year, he will own his own apartment.16 
Joe has no bank account, and most of his friends and family work 
off the books and don’t use banks, either.  No one can afford $1000 to 
pay his bail in cash.  His family and friends might be able to gather 
the $200 to $600 that would be needed as collateral to get a bail bond 
for $2000, but it will take some time.17  It would also require one or 
two people who work on the books to prove their income and agree 
to pay the entire bond should Joe run off.  For many in Joe’s position, 
it is not easy to find someone with a regular paystub who is willing to 
front the collateral and to be liable for the full amount.  Even if he 
does convince his brother’s girlfriend, who is a teacher, and his 
cousin, who drives a taxi, to sign off on his bond, the bail bondsman 
will keep thirty percent to forty percent of the collateral at the end of 
the case.  For a small bond, like this one, the bondsman will often 
keep the entire collateral.  And in many cases, bail bondsmen require 
defendants who bail out with bonds to wear monitoring devices such 
as ankle bracelets, and charge hundreds of dollars monthly for the use 
of those devices.18  These costs can add up to far more than the bail 
that was initially set—the cash payment that Richard made. 
If the judge sets bail that Joe cannot afford, the prospect of 
incarceration will create a strong incentive for him to accept the first 
plea bargain offered by the prosecution,19 even if that offer requires 
him to serve some jail time or would give him a criminal record.  
Richard, fighting his case from the outside, will have time on his side 
and can wait the months or years it takes to get to trial or to receive 
an acceptable offer from the prosecutor.  In at least one jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                             
 16. Because Richard, unlike Joe, is able to pay any fines or fees that are imposed 
in his case, his credit score is never affected, allowing him to get a mortgage. 
 17. A survey conducted by the Federal Reserve in 2015 found that forty-six 
percent of adults could not cover an emergency expense of $400 without selling 
something or borrowing money. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015, at 1 (2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/2015-report-economic-well-being-us-households-
201605.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L6J-Y2WV]. 
 18. See Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle 
Bracelet, You Get Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-
thrown-jail-2065283 [https://perma.cc/Q9MU-FVB2]. 
 19. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2–3, 31–
34 (2010). 
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Joe may choose not to bail out, even if he is able to, because it could 
create the automatic presumption that he is not eligible for a public 
defender.20  Joe knows that even if his family can scrape together bail 
money, he certainly cannot afford the services of a private attorney.  
In Joe’s case, his family could not come up with $1000 cash, but 
eventually paid $400 to a bail bondsman, who explained that he had 
to charge twenty percent collateral and not the usual ten percent 
because it was not a big enough bond to justify his time with only a 
$200 collateral.  When two other bondsmen said the same, Joe’s wife 
simply paid the $400, knowing she probably would not get much, if 
any, of that collateral back.  Luckily, the bondsman did not obligate 
Joe to wear—and pay for—an ankle monitor 
Joe is more likely than Richard to lose out on income even if he is 
released without bail or manages to bail out.  He is a dishwasher at a 
restaurant, and although he has a good relationship with his 
supervisor and his co-workers, the policy is to dock pay for two 
unexcused absences, and to terminate employment upon the third.  
According to that policy, if the arrest-to-arraignment process takes 
two workdays, Joe will lose two days of wages.  If it stretches into 
three, however, he will be fired.21  His supervisor will be sad to see 
him go, but he will also be able to replace him quickly.  City and state 
employees, and those who need licenses, have it even worse.  New 
York has over 100 licensing systems for various occupations, and an 
arrest can trigger immediate suspension of that license, which can 
result in job termination, even if case is later dismissed and the person 
is never convicted.22  In addition to losing his job, Joe runs the risk of 
losing his apartment, even if he is never convicted of anything; arrests 
                                                                                                                             
 20. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1355A(D) (2017). 
 21. See McGregor Smyth, “Collateral” No More: The Practical Imperative for 
Holistic Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . . Or, How to Achieve Consistently Better 
Results for Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139, 163 (2011) [hereinafter 
“Collateral” No More] (“[E]ven short-term detention not only creates inordinate 
pressures to plead guilty but can have drastic immigration and employment 
outcomes.”); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense 
Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 479, 481 (2005) [hereinafter Holistic Is Not a Bad Word] (“Poorer 
defendants are disproportionately affected by this phenomenon, as they are more 
likely to have jobs without vacation benefits, flexibility, or labor protections.”). 
 22. Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 21, at 496 (“When a client lives in 
subsidized housing . . . is a public employee or has an employment license . . . defense 
attorneys should take note.  In all of these cases, the client is likely to have an 
ancillary civil or administrative proceeding pending at the same time as the criminal 
case.”); see also Julie Dressner & Jesse Hicks, A Marijuana Arrest, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Dec. 8, 2013), https://www.buzzfeed.com/jdressner/a-marijuana-arrest?utm_
term=.pe0vn5A11M [https://youtu.be/MEzZSDKOVM4]. 
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often trigger termination proceedings in publicly funded housing.23  In 
administrative hearings, standards of proof are often lower than they 
are in criminal court.24 
C. Pending Case 
During the case, both Joe and Richard will be obligated to make 
regular court appearances approximately once every six weeks.  
These court appearances might take anywhere from one to eight 
hours.  Unlike for civil litigants, they are not optional.  When they 
arrive at their respective courthouses at 9:00 a.m., as they are 
instructed, Richard and Joe are confronted with a security line that 
regularly extends outside and down the block, regardless of the 
weather.  After making their way through security, each finds the 
courtroom and is told to wait.  Both are surrounded by chaos: 
attorneys calling out for clients, weepy parents craning their necks to 
catch a glimpse of an incarcerated son or daughter, and court officers 
barking commands at defendants and their families who pack the 
benches in the courtroom—“take off your hat,” “stop whispering,” 
“no reading allowed.” 
The similarities end there, however.  For Richard, court dates will 
impose far less of a burden.  He takes taxis to and from court to make 
sure he is on time.  He has a nanny for his infant son and his wife has 
flexibility at her job that allows her to care for the child in a pinch.  
His supervisor does not question his occasional absence or lateness.  
Richard’s attorney shows up immediately, as Richard’s case is the 
only court appearance she has scheduled that day.  She spends half an 
hour talking to him outside the courtroom, and, because the clerk can 
see that Richard has a private attorney, he lets them jump the line, 
putting him before everyone represented by a public defender.  
During his appearance before the judge, his attorney and the 
prosecutor decide on another day to return to court to continue 
proceedings.  Richard walks out of the courthouse and is on his way 
to work by 10:15 a.m. 
Joe waits in the courtroom, abiding by the no-phone, no-reading 
rules.  He sees one case called after another.  An hour passes, and Joe 
begins to worry he is in the wrong place, but he cannot use his phone 
to call or text his attorney.  Finally, at 10:45 a.m., he sees his attorney 
rush in and call out his name.  Unlike Richard’s attorney, she must 
appear on ten cases in four separate courtrooms that day, and Joe’s 
                                                                                                                             
 23. “Collateral” No More, supra note 21, at 149. 
 24. Id. 
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courtroom is the second one she gets to in the morning.  She calls his 
name along with two other names, and asks Joe and her two other 
clients to come talk to her outside the courtroom, where she speaks to 
each of them for approximately two minutes each.  She explains to 
Joe that the prosecution has not yet made a plea offer in his case, nor 
have they provided any discovery, so there is not much to do today 
except ask the judge to set a schedule for her to file legal motions and 
choose another date to return to court.  She explains this, asks if he 
has any questions, and signs him up on a list all within those two 
minutes.  Joe takes his seat again in the courtroom and listens to case 
after case called before the judge.  He sees no trials or hearings.  He 
hears one or two people plead guilty to misdemeanors or violations.  
He hears the prosecutors state over and over that they are not ready 
to proceed to trial, and a few defense attorneys say the same.25  
Mostly he hears scheduling discussions.  The majority of time before 
the judge, it seems, is spent deciding on a date to return to court that 
works with the attorneys’ and the judge’s schedules. 
At 1:00 p.m., just as he is sure that his turn must be coming up, Joe 
hears the court officer announce that the court will take its lunch 
break and resume at 2:15 p.m.  Everyone seems to groan 
simultaneously.  As attorneys and clients file out of the courtroom, 
Joe finds his lawyer and asks if he really needs to come back in the 
afternoon, given that this will surely mean taking an entire day off of 
work.  His attorney nods in sympathy and says that if he does not 
return to court, the judge will likely issue a warrant for his arrest.  Joe 
trudges outside, kills an hour without eating because he has no 
appetite, and comes back early, only to sit on a bench and wait.  The 
judge returns to the courtroom at 2:40 p.m., and his case is finally 
called at 3:15 p.m.  The appearance lasts for ninety seconds.26  He 
leaves with a slip of paper in his hand reminding him to return to 
court for his next court appearance, six weeks later.  The appearances 
alone are enough to make him want to plead guilty.  He tries his 
                                                                                                                             
 25. The New York Times conducted a comprehensive investigation into court 
delay in the Bronx in 2013. See William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, Mired in 
Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/
justice-denied-bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html [https://perma.cc/S2PP-
F97D] (“For years trials have been postponed every week because there were not 
enough judges.  But less compelling reasons are also sufficient, including prosecutors’ 
vacation plans and defense lawyers’ birthdays.  Even excuses like a backache and a 
picnic were deemed sound enough to keep the courts waiting.”). 
 26. For an excellent description of the grueling process of calendar days and court 
delays in New York City criminal courts, particularly applied to misdemeanor cases, 
see DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE ch. 9 (2006). 
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boss’s patience every time he asks for time off, and because he does 
not know for sure when he will return to work in the afternoon, he 
must take a full day off each time.  He loses a day’s salary for every 
appearance.  He is unable to reliably pick his children up from 
daycare in the afternoons when he goes to court and has to impose on 
a neighbor.  When he asks his attorney how much longer the case will 
drag on for, she smiles apologetically and says it could be months or, 
if he insists on a trial, years.  Joe wonders how many more of these 
court dates he can afford, or stomach. 
D. Plea Negotiations 
Both Richard’s and Joe’s cases are set for trial after two court 
appearances, during which the defense files an omnibus motion 
requesting pretrial hearings, the prosecution opposes them, and the 
judge grants the defense’s motion.  Even when the case is scheduled 
for trial, however, neither defense has received any discovery from 
the prosecutor, who is not obligated to provide the bulk of discovery 
until right before trial. 
Richard and Joe both face the same misdemeanor drug possession 
charge, which carries a maximum sentence of one year of 
incarceration.27  Although Richard has not received discovery from 
the prosecution, his private attorney is able to investigate the case 
fully, so that he is not entirely in the dark.  The court dates are more 
manageable for him, and he does not feel pressured or desperate to 
put the case behind him.  The collateral consequences of a conviction 
for a low-level drug offense do not threaten to upend his life: he does 
not live in public housing, he does not have a government job, and he 
does not receive government benefits.  Unlike many low-income New 
Yorkers, Richard relies on the private sector; he is far less entangled 
with government programs than someone like Joe, and therefore has 
far less to fear when facing criminal conviction. 
Not knowing the strength of the evidence against him, and knowing 
that if he goes to trial and is convicted, he faces up to a year in jail 
plus all of the collateral consequences,28 Joe gets nervous.  His 
attorney, a dedicated and caring public defender, cannot fully 
investigate his case because her few investigators are occupied with 
more serious felony cases.  The regular court dates begin to wear on 
him.  His boss is losing his patience with his absences.  Joe begins to 
                                                                                                                             
 27. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2017). 
 28. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 2017); infra notes 33–36 and 
accompanying text. 
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consider taking a plea bargain, any plea deal that would not send him 
to jail.  He even begins to consider the idea of taking a deal that 
would involve a short stint in jail, or one that would permanently give 
him a criminal record. 
Assuming that Joe and Richard meet certain eligibility 
requirements, such as a lack of a criminal record, both might be 
eligible for a diversion program, which would allow for their charges 
to be dropped or reduced upon completion of a treatment program.  
However, these programs are often costly in time and dollars, and 
indigent defendants often have a harder time completing the 
programs successfully for reasons entirely out of their control.29  In 
my practice, several of my clients who entered court-mandated 
inpatient programs told me that the conditions they encountered were 
only slightly better than those at Rikers Island.  I saw clients, fully 
engaged in court-mandated treatment programs, struggle or fail for 
reasons having nothing to do with their willingness to comply.  One 
had to borrow from several family members, friends, and his 
girlfriend to afford the twenty-five dollars per treatment session that 
was charged.  Another, months into an inpatient drug treatment 
program during which he had remained completely sober, requested 
permission to leave for the day to see his children.  After visiting with 
them, he stopped in at the courthouse to meet with his case manager 
because he wanted extra support and guidance.  Because he made the 
extra stop at the courthouse and did not return to the program 
directly after seeing his children, the program took away his 
privileges, mandated additional time, and nearly ejected him 
altogether. 
When defendants fail to complete their programs successfully, they 
face a previously negotiated jail alternative, which is often 
significantly more time than would have been offered in the first 
place.  These alternatives are put in place to create a strong incentive 
to comply, but often end up punishing those who are poor, 
disorganized, or suffer from addiction or mental health issues.  One 
client of mine, charged with felony drug sale for facilitating a small 
drug hand-off with an undercover officer, turned down a nine-month 
jail offer and instead embarked on a program.  When he relapsed, he 
failed the program and was sentenced to the jail alternative, which, in 
his case, was three and a half years in an upstate prison.  After he was 
released, he relapsed again. 
                                                                                                                             
 29. See Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second 
Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-
criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html [https://nyti.ms/2hEi1kG]. 
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If Richard does not want a formal diversion program, he might ask 
the prosecutor for the chance to plead to a lesser charge if he 
completes a drug treatment program on his own.  Richard, who has 
excellent medical coverage, and, if he really needed to, could afford 
to pay out-of-pocket, has more options than Joe.30  Richard may be 
able to take a medical leave from his job to complete it if it is an 
inpatient program, or request a modified work schedule if it is an 
outpatient program.  He might also find a program that meets on 
nights or weekends.  Joe, covered only by Medicaid, would have far 
fewer options and might have to choose between his job and the 
program, as many are held during the week when he has work.  Even 
if Joe finds a Medicaid-covered program that meets outside of regular 
work hours, his schedule is subject to change with little notice, and 
chances are high that he would end up having to either miss work or 
fail out of the program.31 
The prosecutor may give Richard and Joe the option to pay a fine 
instead of completing a drug program.  Of course, this option will be 
more readily available to Richard than to Joe.  Unable to afford a 
drug program or pay a fine, Joe is more likely to accept a jail 
sentence.  Ironically, the jail time, like the drug program, may 
ultimately cost Joe his job and end up being more expensive than it 
would have been for Richard. 
E. Aftermath 
Let us assume that Joe and Richard both resolve their cases via 
plea bargain, as the overwhelming majority of defendants do.32  In 
addition to a costlier sentence, Joe stands a good chance of having to 
accept a higher criminal charge than Richard.  He may have to plead 
guilty to a misdemeanor—resulting in a criminal conviction—instead 
of a non-criminal violation, which is more likely for Richard.  The 
reasons for this are similar to those above: Joe is more likely to feel 
pressure to take a plea early because he is incarcerated, or, if he is not 
incarcerated, because repeated court appearances are expensive and 
                                                                                                                             
 30. Although many addiction treatment programs accept insurance, offer some 
financial aid, or have financing options, many remain out of reach for the uninsured 
or for those on Medicaid. See Cost of Drug and Alcohol Rehab: Understanding the 
Cost of Rehab, ADDICTION CENT., https://www.addictioncenter.com/rehab-questions/
cost-of-drug-and-alcohol-treatment [https://perma.cc/3D3V-T4FP]. 
 31. See LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 394: 
IRREGULAR WORK SCHEDULING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2015), http://www.epi.org/
files/pdf/82524.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5JZ-G2PB]. 
 32. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (noting that ninety-four percent 
of state defendants and ninety-seven percent of federal defendants plead guilty). 
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stressful for him.  He therefore might not have the luxury to wait for 
an acceptable offer, which often comes months or years after a case is 
opened.  Richard can afford to wait. 
The higher charge would mean more collateral consequences for 
Joe.  The quantity and scope of collateral consequences attached to 
criminal convictions have proliferated in recent years.  This is due in 
part to new rules that bar people with certain convictions—often low-
level convictions—from certain benefits such as housing, 
employment, student loans, child custody, and immigration status.33  
It also owes to the increased ease with which arrest and conviction 
records can be obtained by private and government parties.34  
According to Professor Michael Pinard, collateral consequences 
“burden individuals long past the expiration of their sentences 
and . . . individually and collectively, frustrate their ability to move 
past their criminal records.”35 
Joe’s criminal record might make it impossible for him to stay in 
his apartment, which he rents through the New York City Housing 
Authority.  In New York, misdemeanor convictions exclude a person 
from public housing for either three or four years, depending on the 
severity of the misdemeanor.36  A conviction might make it difficult 
for him to keep his job or to find a new one; if he is not a citizen, it 
could make him deportable or keep him from naturalizing.  In New 
York and most other jurisdictions, higher charges come with higher 
fines and fees, which, if Joe cannot afford them, will count against his 
credit.  Richard, facing lower fines and fees, can pay them easily, 
preserving his credit score. 
II.  CLOSING THE GAP: PROPOSALS 
A. Arrest: Stop Creating Criminals 
One concrete change we can implement to make Joe’s story more 
closely resemble Richard’s would be to eliminate policing policies 
that ensnare low-income people who pose little or no risk to society.  
                                                                                                                             
 33. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 621 (2014). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral 
Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010). 
 36. This period begins when the individual has completed their sentence, 
assuming he or she has no further convictions or pending charges. See JOHN BAE ET 
AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COMING HOME: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK 
CITY HOUSE AUTHORITY’S FAMILY REENTRY PILOT PROGRAM 9 (2016). 
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This includes hot spot and broken windows policing, which focus 
police efforts on poor neighborhoods and minor offenses.37  Broken 
windows theory,38 which holds that preventing quality-of-life offenses 
such as drinking in public, turnstile jumping, and vandalism can help 
maintain order and prevent more serious crime, was implemented as 
a policing strategy in New York City in the 1990s by police 
commissioner William Bratton and mayor Rudolph Giuliani.39  
Misdemeanor and violation arrests increased sharply.40  According to 
Human Rights Watch, in 1989, half of arrests in New York City were 
for felonies.41  Twenty years later, almost three-quarters, 72%, were 
for misdemeanors.42  Most of those arrested for misdemeanors, 
82.4%, were black or Hispanic.43  In Manhattan during 2016 alone, 
police arrested nearly 25,000 people for fare evasion—usually, 
jumping the turnstile in the subway—a policy that has recently come 
under scrutiny by prosecutors for its disproportionate impact on low-
income people.44 
                                                                                                                             
 37. See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs 
of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 
292 (2009) (“Many of [the] costs are externalized, born by individual arrestees, their 
families, their communities, and the larger community of taxpayers to the extent that 
arrests and criminal records lead to further arrests, incarceration, or 
un(der)employment.”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining 
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297–
300 (2011) (discussing the significant collateral consequences of minor misdemeanor 
convictions); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1062–66 (2013); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1331–37 (2012). 
 38. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465 [https://perma.cc/NHE5-URLW]. 
 39. See Reuven Fenton, Bill Bratton Still Believes in ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, 
N.Y. POST (June 24, 2016, 1:16 AM), http://nypost.com/2016/06/24/bill-bratton-sill-
believes-in-broken-windows-policing [https://perma.cc/8HJF-M98M]; William Wan, 
Does New York City’s ‘Broken Windows’ Policing Work?: New Report Says No, 
WASH. POST (June 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/06/22/does-nypds-broken-windows-policing-work-new-report-says-no 
[https://perma.cc/FF8K-MSUV]. 
 40. For an analysis of misdemeanor arrests in New York City, see Kohler-
Hausmann, supra note 33, at 614. 
 41. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 10. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  In the Bronx in 2016, only thirty-one percent of adult arrests were for 
felonies. See N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Adult Arrests: 2007–2016, 
Bronx (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/
Bronx.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7M9-8HT3].  
 44. James C. McKinley Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to 
Court May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/30/nyregion/subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [https://nyti.ms/2urQNnM]. 
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We can also eliminate most entrapment-like arrest policies, which 
we might call “created crime.”  Created crimes are those offenses that 
never would have occurred if not for police involvement.  They 
include sting operations, wherein undercover officers pose as 
prostitutes or as patrons and try to get civilians to agree to a sexual 
transaction before making an arrest, and “buy and bust” drug 
operations, wherein undercover officers posing as drug users target 
individuals who appear to them to be users—very often, poor people 
of color—and ask them to facilitate a small drug sale.45  The target 
then finds a street-level dealer and facilitates a deal between the 
undercover and the dealer, after which he or she is promptly arrested 
for drug sale (as opposed to mere possession).46  Much of the time, 
only the facilitator is arrested, not the dealer.47  These sting 
operations target individuals in low-income neighborhoods and tend 
to ensnare some of society’s most vulnerable members—in these 
cases, drug users and sex workers.  These people are often indigent 
addicts whose criminal behaviors harm them more than others.  
Targeting people to catch them in acts that otherwise would never 
have taken place is tremendously costly for police departments, and 
therefore taxpayers, requiring many officers’ labor, as compared to 
patrol arrests, which usually require only one or two officers.48  
Further, they create the very real possibility of enticing people into 
addictive and illegal behaviors that they may have worked hard to 
avoid.49 
In my experience as a public defender, I have seen more than one 
individual relapse after long periods of sobriety because of a “buy and 
bust” sting operation.  One client, an immigrant in his mid-fifties, 
described the drug set-up upon meeting me through the bars of 
central booking soon after his arrest.  He then put his head in his 
                                                                                                                             
 45. See Goldstein, supra note 9. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (“The big underlying question is why a nine-person buy-and-bust team did 
not follow [the defendant] to the dealer where he got [the drugs] from . . . .  Everyone 
[on the jury] was scratching their heads, wondering what the heck is wrong with our 
system.”). 
 48. Id. (“One juror said that what troubled the jury the most was that a nine-
person narcotics squad—which included two undercover officers, several 
investigators and supporting officers—would bring a case against a single addict.”). 
 49. A defendant in a Manhattan buy-and-bust case told a reporter: 
For him to put the money in my hands, as an addict, let me tell you what 
happens . . . .  I like to think I could resist it, but I’m way beyond that.  My 
experience has shown me that 1,000 times out of 1,000 times, I will be 
defeated. 
Id.  
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hands and said, “Now I’m in jail, and I’m relapsed.  Now what?”  
Another client, a middle-aged woman, told me that her husband of 
fifteen years had recently left her, so she had been in a particularly 
vulnerable mindset, financially and emotionally, when an undercover 
officer pulled up in his car, lowered his window, and solicited sex 
from her in exchange for money.  Police departments, in short, should 
eliminate policies that disproportionately pull indigent and vulnerable 
people into the criminal justice system, especially those who pose 
little or no danger to society. 
B. Bail Hearing: Stop Incarcerating Poverty 
Arraignments, or bail hearings, need not cost indigent defendants 
more than wealthy ones.  First, everyone should have legal 
representation at a hearing when bail is decided.  People who are 
represented by an attorney are two and a half times more likely to be 
released without bail being set than those without counsel.50  Further, 
defendants representing themselves might unknowingly waive certain 
rights or foreclose certain defenses, making their cases less successful 
later on.  Equally important, judges must stop allowing people to sit 
in jail throughout their cases simply because they cannot afford to pay 
bail.  An analysis of income data and bail data by the Prison Policy 
Initiative revealed that the median bail bond amount in the United 
States equals eight months of income for the typical detained 
defendant.51  Seventy percent of people in jail have been convicted of 
no crime; they are simply waiting for pending cases, most of which 
involve non-violent accusations, to be resolved.52 
If a person is held in jail during the pendency of the case, her 
chances of pleading guilty increase significantly, as do her non-bail 
court fees.53  A study conducted over the course of a decade in New 
                                                                                                                             
 50. See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?: The Empirical 
and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720 
(2001) (summarizing an eighteen-month study in Baltimore, Maryland). 
 51. See BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
DETAINING THE POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF 
POVERTY AND JAIL TIME 3 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
incomejails.html [https://perma.cc/9DYT-SW2C]. 
 52. See PETER WAGNER & BERNADETTE RABUY, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2017 (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html [https://perma.cc/6XJ5-MRVR]. 
 53. One Philadelphia study found that “pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase 
in the likelihood of being convicted, an effect largely explained by an increase in 
guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise would have been acquitted or had their 
charges dropped.” See Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to 
Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 17–18 (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
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York City concluded that pretrial detainees were more likely to be 
convicted, to be sentenced to incarceration, and to receive longer 
sentences than those who were not detained pretrial.54  Specifically, 
this study found that among defendants accused of misdemeanors, 
those who were released after a bail hearing were convicted fifty 
percent of the time, those who were incarcerated on bail for part of 
the pendency of their cases were convicted sixty percent to seventy 
percent of the time, and those who were detained for the entire 
pendency of the case were convicted ninety percent of the time.55 
We need individualized bail assessments based on actual 
information about what defendants can afford, so that bail can serve 
its intended purpose: to create a meaningful incentive for people to 
return to court during their cases.  After all, the purpose of bail is to 
ensure that people will comply with court obligations until the case is 
finished, while remaining in the community; it is not to incarcerate 
low-income people on the basis of an as-yet unproven accusation.56  
For Joe, putting up $200 is a stronger incentive to return to each court 
date than a bail of $2000 would be to Richard.  Judges should conduct 
an inquiry and determine, based on a person’s employment and their 
family’s resources, what an appropriate sum might be to make sure he 
returns to court, if any bail is needed at all.  In the vast majority of 
cases, people return to court because they are required to do so, and 
they do not need any external incentive.57  Releasing people without 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.econ.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Stevenson.jmp2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9LN-ESP3].  The study also found that “[p]retrial detention also leads to a 41% 
increase in the amount of non-bail court fees owed and a 42% increase in the length 
of the incarceration sentence.” Id. at 1.  Another controlled study, conducted in 
Kentucky, reached similar conclusions. See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., 
ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON 
SENTENCING OUTCOMES (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/W82K-
658V]. 
 54. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., DECADE OF 
BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115, 127 (2012), http://www.nycja.org/library.php 
(follow “Download” hyperlink beside “A Decade of Bail Research in New York 
City”) [https://perma.cc/R2MM-X4MW].  
 55. Id. at 116. 
 56. See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, A.B.A DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_educati
on_network/how_courts_work/bail.html [https://perma.cc/4XRQ-RWDC] (“Bail is 
the amount of money defendants must post to be released from custody until their 
trial.  Bail is not a fine.  It is not supposed to be used as punishment.  The purpose of 
bail is simply to ensure that defendants will appear for trial and all pretrial hearings 
for which they must be present.”). 
 57. In New York City in 2011, among defendants who were released either on 
their own recognizance or by posting bail, eighty-six percent appeared at every court 
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bail, or setting affordable bail to serve its original purpose, would 
eliminate the need for low-income people to be removed from their 
lives, spend their cases in custody, feel tremendous pressure to plead 
guilty, or lose vast sums of money to bail bondsmen. 
Some jurisdictions, notably New Jersey,58 Maryland,59 Chicago,60 
and New Mexico61 have implemented wholesale reforms to their bail 
system, some of them eliminating cash bail altogether.  New Jersey 
has replaced monetary bail with a risk assessment system, whereby 
defendants are assessed for likelihood of flight and new criminal 
activity, not ability to pay.62  Politicians63 and judges64 have, in many 
cases, helped to spearhead these new measures.  Indeed, it seems that 
this idea is moving from the fringes to the mainstream.  One marker 
of just how lucrative it is for bail bondsmen to extract money from 
those who cannot afford their bail is how fiercely the bail bonds 
industry is fighting these efforts with lawsuits and political pressure.65 
                                                                                                                             
date. See N.Y.C. OFFICE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATOR, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INDICATOR REPORT 3 (2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2013/
criminal_justice_indicator_report_summer_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C56Z-PRC9]. 
 58. See generally Memorandum from Christopher S. Porrino, N.J. Att’y Gen., to 
Dir., Div. of Crim. Justice (May 24, 2017), http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases17/Revised-
AG-Directive-2016-6_Introductory-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ADV-GPM8]. 
 59. See Michael Dresser, Maryland Senate Passes Bill to Pare Back Court’s Bail 
Rule, BALT. SUN (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:16 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/politics/bs-md-bail-reform-senate-20170322-story.html [https://perma.cc/
PY5S-5LMK]. 
 60. See Andy Grimm, Latest Move in Bail Reform: Chief Judge Replaces All 
Bond Court Judges, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:42 PM), 
http://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/latest-move-in-bail-reform-chief-judge-
replaces-all-bond-court-judges [https://perma.cc/Z4JP-F5BS]. 
 61. See Associated Press, NM Voters Pass Constitutional Amendment on Bail 
Reform, KOB4 (Nov. 8, 2016, 11:29 PM), http://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/nm-
voters-pass-constitutional-amendment-on-bail-reform-crime-prison-sentencing/
4313409/ [https://perma.cc/CPZ2-RD7C]. 
 62. See Porinno, supra note 58, at 10. 
 63. See Casey Tolan, Kamala Harris, Rand Paul Introduce Bail Reform Bill, 
MERCURY NEWS (July 20, 2017, 4:21 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/20/
kamala-harris-bail-reform-rand-paul-bill-congress [https://perma.cc/DE2Y-SV8U]. 
 64. See James C. McKinley, Jr., State’s Chief Judge, Citing ‘Injustice,’ Lays Out 
Plans to Alter Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/02/nyregion/jonathan-lippman-bail-incarceration-new-york-state-chief-judge.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2klsFy2]. 
 65. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie has commented, “[t]he bail bonds 
community has made a fortune over the years predominantly on the backs of poor 
people in New Jersey.” Sergio Bichao, ‘Freezing Crook’ Arrested Day After 
Release–But Christie Defends Bail Reform, N.J.101.5 (Feb. 13, 2017, 8:31 PM), 
http://nj1015.com/freezing-crook-arrested-day-after-release-cops-say-but-christie-
defends-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/9ELE-2Z5G]; see also Alan Feuer, New Jersey 
Is Front Line in a National Battle Over Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), 
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C. Pending Case: Stop Dragging Criminal Defendants to Court 
One clear change we can make to create more equity during the 
pendency of criminal cases is to stop requiring defendants to be 
present for each court appearance.  Civil litigants generally are not 
required to be present and it is unclear why court appearances should 
be any more necessary for criminal litigants.66  Judges might require 
appearances on certain court dates, such as those on which a plea is 
anticipated or a case is set for trial, but there is no reason for 
defendants to be present for other appearances, such as when 
decisions are made on legal motions filed by attorneys.67  For low-
income clients whose lives and schedules are at times more chaotic 
and less predictable than those of middle- or upper-class defendants, 
getting to court can be challenging through no fault of their own.68  A 
judge once refused to believe that my client, an elderly woman who 
had recently suffered a heart attack, was late to court because the 
elevator in her public housing complex was broken and she could not 
walk down the twelve flights of stairs.  The judge issued a warrant for 
my client’s arrest.  Once we provided proof that the elevator was 
indeed broken, the judge vacated and expunged the warrant.  It can 
be difficult for judges and prosecutors, who are generally not as low-
income as the indigent defendants they see every day, to understand 
the challenges that are inherent in daily life for them.  The 
consequences of those misunderstandings can be disastrous for 
defendants.  Sparing defendants the burden of missing a day of work 
                                                                                                                             
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-reform-lawsuits.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2viV4tL]; Victoria Prieskop, Bail Bondsmen Say New Mexico 
Supreme Court Ruined Them, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/bail-bondsmen-say-new-mexico-supreme-court-
ruined [https://perma.cc/58U6-7HGW]; Ryan J. Reilly, Dog The Bounty Hunter and 
a Top Conservative Lawyer are Trying to Save the Bail Industry, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 23, 2017, 7:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bail-industry-
unconstitutional_us_58adf025e4b05ca474a04011 [https://perma.cc/8SC9-R3UW]. 
 66. See David Feige, Opinion, Waiting and Waiting . . . for Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/opinion/waiting-and-waiting-for-
justice.html [https://nyti.ms/YfjQqV] (arguing for criminal defendants to be excused 
from most routine court dates). 
 67. Common legal motions in misdemeanor criminal cases in New York include 
motions for a judge to dismiss a case, to exclude or admit certain evidence, or to 
order pre-trial evidentiary hearings. 
 68. The frustration of navigating a low-level state criminal charge has been well 
documented. See generally, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT (1992) (studying case processing in Connecticut courts and concluding 
that the real costs to defendants in low-level cases are not the sentences imposed but 
rather the costs incurred by being processed through the system, such as lost wages 
and bail bond commissions). 
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or finding childcare for each and every court date over a period of 
months or years would allow them to fight their cases instead of 
feeling coerced into accepting a plea bargain. 
D. Plea Negotiations: Create Alternatives to Incarceration for 
Everyone 
As has been well documented, our criminal justice system is no 
longer a trial system; it is primarily a plea system.  Approximately 
ninety-five percent of criminal cases end in plea bargains and that is 
especially true for low-level state charges such as the ones considered 
above.69  The options available to defendants when considering a plea 
bargain are therefore of paramount importance.  Defendants often 
accept whatever plea bargains are offered to them—either because 
they have accepted responsibility for the offense or because they 
cannot afford for the case to continue any longer.  Those in the latter 
category may be forced to accept an incarceratory sentence when 
meaningful alternatives to incarceration, such as rehabilitation 
programs or the payment of fines, are unavailable to them.  If we 
want to create a more equal system, one where the prisons and jails 
are not filled disproportionately with low-income people, we must 
create meaningful alternatives to incarceration and make them 
accessible to all.  This means programs that are fully funded, have 
flexible hours, and do not require insurance.  For every option that 
allows defendants to pay to resolve their cases, instead of suffering 
through incarceration, we should require that a free, flexible option 
be offered as well.70 
E. Aftermath: Ban Collateral Consequences 
Finally, the vast majority of collateral consequences should be 
banned.  Collateral consequences affect the poor disproportionately 
because they limit access in particular to government programs for 
low-income people, the very people for whom many of these 
programs were created and the people who rely on them most to live, 
work, study, and put food on the table.  These include student loans, 
                                                                                                                             
 69. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-
plead-guilty [https://perma.cc/EWT7-QZK9]. 
 70. It should be noted that those charged in New York City are relatively more 
fortunate than those in other jurisdictions, as funded alternative-to-incarceration 
programs are available in all of the boroughs, although they are not available to every 
criminal defendant in every case. See, e.g., Operating Programs, CTR. FOR COURT 
INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/projects [https://perma.cc/3V43-PV6S]. 
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public housing, public-sector jobs, and welfare.71  The Supreme Court 
has held that public housing agencies can evict tenants for drug-
related activity of non-tenant relatives or guests, regardless of 
whether the tenants knew, or should have known, about that 
activity.72  This means that a low-income family of four, living lawfully 
in public housing, can be made homeless because, unbeknownst to 
them, a cousin comes to visit, carrying two Percocet pills in his pocket 
that were not prescribed to him.  Of course, for those living in non-
subsidized housing, there is no such risk. 
Most collateral consequences have no relation to the offenses they 
accompany.  A conviction for marijuana possession in New York, for 
example, can disqualify a person from public housing for several years 
and can make a non-citizen deportable.73  Those consequences that 
do seem tailored to the conviction, such as those for sex offenses, 
have been widely criticized by those on the left and the right for being 
tremendously restrictive, unduly harsh, and ineffective at preventing 
future harm.74 
CONCLUSION 
For both Richard and Joe, getting arrested and facing criminal 
charges was painful, degrading, and scary.  But the footprint it left on 
Richard’s life was smaller and more contained.  The night he was 
arrested was one of the worst nights of his life; he tried to get some 
                                                                                                                             
 71. See Eli Hager, Six States Where Felons Can’t Get Food Stamps, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Feb. 4, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/04/six-
states-where-felons-can-t-get-food-stamps [https://perma.cc/GY4M-U7W9]. 
 72. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002). 
 73. See BAE ET AL., supra note 36, at 9. 
 74. A DOJ-funded study conducted in New Jersey compared sex offense trends 
during the ten years before and after the implementation of Megan’s Law, both a 
federal law and an informal name for state laws, requiring law enforcement to make 
information about registered sex offenders available to the public. See KRISTEN 
ZGOBA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEGAN’S LAW: ASSESSING THE PRACTICAL 
AND MONETARY EFFICACY 2 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
225370.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVT2-NP2K] (“Megan’s Law has no effect on 
community tenure (i.e., time to first re-arrest) . . . no demonstrable effect in reducing 
sexual re-offenses . . . no effect on the type of sexual re-offense or first time sexual 
offense[, and] no effect on reducing the number of victims involved in sexual 
offenses.”); see also, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER 
LAWS IN THE U.S. 3 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us0907webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3QF-J4DD] (“The evidence is 
overwhelming . . . that these laws cause great harm to the people subject to them.  On 
the other hand, proponents of these laws are not able to point to convincing evidence 
of public safety gains from them.”); Eli Lehrer, Rethinking Sex Offender Registries, 
26 NAT’L AFF. 52, 54 (2016) (“Current registries are too inclusive, are overly 
restrictive, and end up hurting some of those they are intended to help.”). 
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sleep on the metal benches in central bookings, he declined a cheese 
sandwich and carton of milk, opting for hunger, and waited to see his 
attorney in court.  With a clean record, a private attorney, a steady 
job, and relatives in the courtroom to support him, Richard was 
quickly released on his own recognizance—that is, without any bail 
being set.  Over the following eight months, he appeared on his case 
six times.  He did not mind these appearances, as they only took a 
couple of hours and he never lost out on wages or annoyed his boss or 
co-workers by attending.  Before each appearance, his attorney and 
her investigator worked to gather evidence, research the relevant law, 
and negotiate with the prosecutor.  Initially, the prosecution offered 
to reduce the criminal misdemeanor charge to a non-criminal 
violation if Richard would complete a brief outpatient drug program 
of his choice.  He was willing to do a treatment program, and could 
afford to, but he preferred a less onerous sentence.  He asked his 
attorney to keep pushing for a non-criminal violation without a 
treatment program.  Eventually, upon presenting some of her 
investigator’s findings to the prosecutor, his attorney prevailed.  
Richard pled guilty to a non-criminal violation of disorderly 
conduct,75 paid $120 in court surcharges,76 and left.  His job, his 
housing, and his life remained intact.  A source of embarrassment at 
first, the arrest later became a story he told at parties. 
For Joe, the costs were higher.  The arrest and arraignment were 
painful and degrading, especially because he did not have access to an 
attorney until he reached court.  With no one to advocate for him, Joe 
made an ill-advised statement to the police.  Joe’s wife wanted to 
come support him at his arraignment, but she was working the night 
shift when he went before the judge, and she did not have the 
flexibility to leave.  Without any family in the courtroom to vouch for 
him, and after the prosecutor used his statement to the police against 
him, Joe was already in a worse position than Richard, even before 
the judge set bail.  Cash bail allowed Richard to buy his freedom 
quickly, but for Joe, because his family had less money on hand, bail 
was costlier.  Joe was taken to Rikers Island, during which time his 
wife paid over $200 to cover childcare so that she could go to work.  It 
took his wife four days to collect enough money for collateral, get a 
bond, and wait for the bail bondsman to bail him out; at that point, 
Joe was released.  Luckily, Joe was a valued employee, and his boss 
let him return to work after missing four days without pre-approval.  
                                                                                                                             
 75. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2017). 
 76. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.10 (McKinney 2017). 
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Joe appeared on his case three times, and each time he lost a day of 
wages.  Without access to the evidence against him, knowing that he 
faced up to a year of incarceration, with his boss’s patience wearing 
thinner with each day of work he missed, and with no end to the case 
in sight, Joe decided to take a plea.  He knew that a drug treatment 
program was out of the question for him, given the expense and his 
variable schedule, so he decided to take the only other offer available 
to him: pleading guilty to the top charge, criminal possession of a 
controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and a sentence of time 
served.77  Unlike the disorderly conduct charge that Richard 
accepted, the misdemeanor would give him a permanent criminal 
record, would put his public housing in jeopardy for years, and would 
come with higher surcharges—which, if he failed to pay, would count 
against his credit—but he knew he could not hold out any longer for a 
better offer or for trial.  Making the case end was the only way to 
keep his job and his housing intact for the time being.  As for what 
would happen in the future, he had to cross his fingers and wait. 
In our current criminal justice system, Joe pays more.  He pays 
more in higher odds of being arrested; in his likelihood of being 
incarcerated throughout his case for inability to pay bail; in costs 
owed to bail bondsmen, childcare providers, and lost wages; in life 
disruptions such as interference with employment and housing; in 
time spent waiting in court for each scheduled court appearance; in 
constrained options for resolving the case; and, when alternative 
resolutions fall through, in having a criminal conviction for the rest of 
his life.  If New York implemented the above proposed solutions, Joe 
would not face a higher likelihood of being arrested simply for living 
in the Bronx; he would not face the possibility of being held on bail 
without being convicted of any crime; he would not have to lose a day 
of wages, and possibly his job, each time his case was scheduled in 
court; he would have an equal opportunity to participate in programs 
that provide alternatives to incarceration; and he would not risk 
losing his job, his home, and his other benefits simply because he was 
charged with a crime.  In short, the process of misdemeanor criminal 
justice would be less coercive for Joe, leaving him freer to avail 
himself of his constitutional rights, including his right to a trial and his 
right to remain silent.  Joe would still have a harder time finding 
decent jobs and housing, and a dollar to Joe would still be worth 
much more than a dollar to Richard.  Still, at the very least, our 
                                                                                                                             
 77. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2017). 
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criminal justice system would stop charging poor people more simply 
for the crime of being poor. 
